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Parties litigant desire to obtain before trial all possible infor-
mation relevant to the matter in issue. Obviously their oppon-
ents possess much of this information but are usually reluctant
to divulge it. If the production of such information is compelled,
however, this will frequently result in promptly clearing up those
issues in the case concerning which there can be no bona fide
controversy, thus saving time and cost both to the parties and to
the state. Moreover such compulsion may tend to prevent sub-
stantial injustice to the party seeking information in the exclu-
sive possession of his opponent. Both these results are desirable.
But other considerations of equal social import render it unde-
sirable to enable a party to find out before trial all that his
adversary knows about the case. One problem is therefore to as-
certain the extent to which discovery should be allowed, in order
best to promote its usefulness without violating the latter consid-
erations. The other problem is to find the machinery best
adapted to obtain production of information, or documents, to
the extent found desirable. This article aims to deal with these
two problems and with a view to their solution attempts a sur-
vey and examination of the existing statutes and decisions on the
subject.
Historically, courts of common law had no machinery to
enforce a general discovery of testimony or production and in-
spection of documents before trial. Equity would, however,
entertain jurisdiction over a bill of discovery in aid of an in-
tended action at law or defense therein, or a defense in an equity
suit. And the courts of chancery would also compel discovery
as ancillary to a demand for relief which they had jurisdiction to
grant., The answer to such a bill was made under oath. In the
courts of many of the United States as well as in the federal
courts a bill for discovery may still be brought; 2 in some it is
I BRAY, DISCOVERY (1885) 4; Langdell, Discovery Under the Judicature
Act (1897) 11 HARV. L. REV. 137, 205; Langdell, Discovery Under the
Judicature Act (1898) 12 HARV. L. REv. 151; Abbott, Co-operation of "Law"
and "Equity" (1893) 7 HARV. L. REV. 76; Isham v. Gilbert, 3 Conn. 166,
171 (1819); 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1881) §§ 190-209.
2 GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 4543; MD. ANN. CODE: (Bagby, 1924)
art. 16, §§ 164-167; MASS. GEN. LAWs (1921) C. 214, §§ 12, 13; N. H. Pun.
LAWS (1926) c. 317, § 1; TEx. ANN. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 2002; VA.
CODE ANN. (1919) § 6238; Preston v. Equity Sav. Bank, 287 Fed. 1003
(Ct. of App. D. C. 1923) (bill for discovery and an accounting); Campbell
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still apparently the only way of procuring any discovery before
trial.3 The federal courts will not entertain an equitable bill for
discovery in aid of an action 4 or defense 6 at law on the grounds
that the statute enabling the law courts to compel discovery "in
the trial of actions at law" (as in equity)r affords an adequate
remedy. But since this statute has been construed not to em-
brace any discovery before the trial,T this holding seems unde-
sirable. A similar statute 8 in Maryland was held to be no bar to
a bill of discovery in aid of a law action."
Originally the bill for discovery consisted in charges of evi-
dence on which were based interrogatories or a prayer that docu-
ments in the possession and control of the defendant be produced
for the plaintiff's inspection. Only a plaintiff in equity could ob-
tain discovery, so that a defendant in any suit or a pJaintiff at
law would be compelled to bring a separate suit to do so."' The
defendant in an equitable action is sometimes empowered by
statute to attach interrogatories to his pleading which the plain-
tiff must answer.1 In order that a bill for discovery as ancillary
to equitable relief be maintainable, a prhima facic Case for such
relief must appear in the complaint or it will be demurrable as
a whole, and discovery will not be decreed. 12 Nor will discovery
v. Knight, 92 Fla. 246, 109 So. 577 (1926); Boriss Constr. Co. v. Deasey,
212 Ala. 528, 103 So. 470 (1925); Erswell v. Ford, 208 Ala. 101, 94 So.
67 (1922); Lopez v. Lopez, 27 N. M. 621, 204 Pac. 75 (1922). A few
states allow an action for discovery only against irresponsible perzons
jointly or severally liable on a contract with others whose names the
plaintiff has failed to ascertain by exercise of due diligence, for the purposTe
of getting a disclosure of the names of such other joint or several obligors.
ARR. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) §§ 1037-9; IOWA CODn, (1927)
§§ 10953, 10954; KY. CODEs (Carroll, 1927) § 685.
3 ILL. Rzv. STAT. (1925) §§ 20-27; ME. REV. STAT. (1916) C. 82, §§ 6,
15; PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 4563.
4 Durant v. Goss, 12 F. (2d) 682 (C. C. A. 0th, 192G); Bradford v.
Ind. Harbor Belt R. R., 300 Fed. 78 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924).
0 Texas Co. v. Cohen, 15 F. (2d) 358 (C. C. JAL 2d, 1920); Welles v.
Rhodes, 59 Conn. 498, 22 At. 286 (1890).
61 STAT. 82 (1861), 28 U. S. C. § 636 (1926).
7 Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U. S. 533, 31 Sup. Ct. 683 (1910), criticized
in Note (1911) 60 U. OF PA. L. REv. 202.
BAID. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 75, § 106.
9 Hill v. Pinder, 150 Md. 397, 133 Atl. 134 (1926).
10 Langdell, Discovery under the Judicature Act (1897) 11 HuRV. L. REv.
205, 216, et seq.; Langdell, Discovery vndcr the Judicatvre Act (1S98) 12
HARV. L. REV. 151, 160 et seq.
1 ALA. CIV. CODE (1923) § 6569; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses,
1921) § 1248; Ky. CODES (Carroll, 1927) § 140.
12 Altman v. McClintock, 20 F. (2d) 226 (D. Wyo. 1927); Erswell v.
Ford, 205 Ala. 494, 88 So. 429 (1921); Middletown Bank v. Rus, 3 Conn.
135 (1819). Where the plaintiff is entitled to a money decree but not to
an equitable accounting, discovery will not be granted to ascertain the
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be granted in an action to enforce a penalty or including a charge
of a criminal offense.13. And it seems that where the bill discloses
on its face that the plaintiff is already in possession of the
information sought, there will be no discovery.14 Where the
adverse party from whom discovery is sought is a private corpo-
ration, the proper officer, member, or agent must under some stat-
utes give the discovery demanded on his own oath.', Originally
the answer was given under the common seal of a corporation,
and the officer or member was required to answer on his oath
only when made a party. And such an officer seems still to be a
necessary party defendant to a bill of discovery in the absence
of any statute dealing with the matter.10 The corporation is
under a duty to ascertain only what its present officers or agents
have come to know while in the scope of their employment."
But where the officer is made a party he must disclose all his
material knowledge. i s
The answer to a bill of discovery must always be under oath
and this cannot be waived by the plaintiff.19 The defendant need
not make an answer which tends to incriminate him, which is
protected by professional privilege, which relates solely to his
own case, or which it is against public interest for him to dis-
close.20 The question as to what pertains solely to a party's case
will be taken up later. Objections to giving discovery on any
amount due him. Dorrough v. Fertilizer Co., 210 Ala. 530, 98 So. 735
(1924); Loose v. Plaster Co., 266 Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920).
"3 Ohlendorf v. Bennett, 241 Ill. App. 537 (1926) ; 3 STORY, EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE (1886) § 1942. Contra: Board of Commissioners v. Maretti, 93
N. J. Eq. 513, 117 Atl. 483 (1922) (the bill in effect charged embezzlement;
the remedy under this decision is to object to making incriminating answers,
but the bill is not demurrable).
14 Crowson v. Cody, 207 Ala. 476, 93 So. 420 (1921) ; cf. Henry v. Dono-
van, 148 Miss. 278, 114 So. 482 (1927) (bill for discovery of amount of
taxes from certain source in hands of commissioner must contain allegation
of due diligence to ascertain that amount).
"s ILL. REV. STAT. (1925) c. 22, § 22; Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway,
1927) § 360 (answer in chancery of corporation to be on oath of officer
rather than under seal); Southern Ry. v. Cotton Oil Co., 126 Miss. 562,
89 So. 228 (1921) (construing statute as dispensing with necessity of
making the officer a party).
'
0 Boriss Construction Co. v: Deasey, supra note 2, at 529, 103 So. at
471; POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 199.
'7 ILL. REV. STAT. (1925) c. 22, § 22.
Is Wright v. Dame, 42 Mass. 237 (1840).
'9 ILL. REV. STAT. (1925) c. 22, §§ 20, 21; MASS. GEN. LAWs (1921) c.
214, § 13; GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 4546; Palmetto Fire Ins. Co.
v. Allen, 141 Miss. 681, 105 So. 482 (1925) (where bill for discovery, not
being under oath, waives sworn answer, it is demurrable).
20 GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 4544 provides specifically that such
answers are not required to be given. These grounds for resisting discovery
obtain under the present English practice and did obtain in the old Chan-
cery practice. POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 16, §§ 201-203.
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of these grounds are stated in the sworn answer and, so far as
well stated, conclude the plaintiff.2- The defendant in his answer
may explain any of his admissions.2 - If the answer is insuffi-
cient, a further and better answer may be required by the court
on motion.23 If the defendant refuses to give discovery within
the time specified by the court, or if his answer is insufficient and
evasive and he fails to give further satisfactory answer, the de-
fendant is liable to attachment for contempt and may have the
bill taken against him as confessed. 2 The costs of a bill seeking
discovery alone are taxable against the plaintiff.r The answer
to a bill of discovery may be used on the trial as evidence by
either party.0 And such evidence can be contradicted only on
the testimony of two credible witnesses, or the testimony of one
with corroborating circumstances,2 7 unless there has been a stat-
utory change of the rule. 2 8  Some jurisdictions have abolished
equitable bills for discovery, - in others they are rarely used.& 3
DISCOVERY UNDER STATUTE
The equitable bill of discovery and its history are of interest in
dode jurisdictions today chiefly because of their influence on dis-
22 Langdell, op. cit. supra note 1, at 210.
22 GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 454S.
23Langdell, Discovery under the Judicature Act (1897) 11 HAnv. L. REV.
205, 208 et seq.; ILL. REv. STAT. (1925) c. 22, § 24.2 4Langdell, Discoverj under the Judicature Act (1898) 12 HAnv. L.
REV. 151, 157; ILL. REv. STAT. (1925) c. 22, § 24 (contempt); ALA. Civ.
CODE (1923) §§ 6569, 6570. In Maryland, if the defendant fails to appear
and has an interlocutory decree entered against him on this account, the
plaintiff, after satisfying the court by affidavit that the matter or thing
sought is in the defendant's private kmowledge, and that there is reasonable
ground to believe that it exists, is entitled to have the bill taken as con-
fessed so far as it deals with such matter or thing. DID. Axx. CODE (Bagby,
1924) art. 16, §§ 164, 165.. But the defendant may file answer before
final decree on terms imposed by the court. Ibid. art. 10, § 1G7.
25 GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 4547; MASs. GEN. LAws (1921) e.
261, § 12.
2 6 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1886) § 1528; see Fant v. Miller, 17
Gatt. 187, 205 (Va. 1867). Only the responsive portions of the answer
are evidence. GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 4548; Marion v. Faxon,
20 Conn. 486 (1850). In Alabama only the party taking the discovery
may use it in evidence. ALA. CIrv. CODE (1923) § 6573.
27 GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 4547; Lopez v. Lopez, mupra vote 2;
STORY icC. cit. svpra note 26. Langdell says that the rule is borrowed
from the ecclesiastical courts. Langdell, op. cit. supra note 24, at 153.
28 ILL. REv. STAT. (1925) c. 22, § 25 (answer may be contradicted as
any other testimony).
29 For example, North Carolina has abolished the equitable bill of dis-
covery. N. C. CODE (1927) § 899.
3o ARK. DiG. STAT. (Crawford & Moes, 1921) §§ 1037-1039; IOWA CODE
(1927) §§ 10953, 10954, etc. have limited greatly the scope of such bill.
See supra note 2.
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covery under the statutory provisions. Testimony and admis-
sions of the opposite party are obtained under these statutes
either by propounding written interrogatories to be answered in
writing, or by an oral examination of the party before trial.
There are also various provisions the ultimate purpose of which
is to allow a party to inspect and copy documents in the posses-
sion or power of the adverse party. There are, however, many
features which are common to discovery in general. These will
be -treated first and an analysis and criticism of the various
methods and their effectiveness will be taken up later.
Actions in which discoveri may be had. Virtually none of
the statutes specify the type of action in which the machinery
of discovery provided shall be available, except that the provi-
sions are applicable to civil actions only.31 There are, however,
some restrictions that have been read into the statutes by judicial
construction. Some courts, at any rate, follow the traditions of
equity and refuse to compel discovery in actions to enforce pen-
alties and forfeitures.2 In probate actions discovery seems to
be fairly generally allowed.3 3 But there is more question as to
actions for divorce.3 4 In England the machinery for obtaining
discovery is available in arbitration proceedings, while in New
York it is deemed to be unsuitable and unavailable in such a
field.3 In New York, in the first department, there is a decided
reluctance to grant discovery in actions for libel or for personal
injuries.30 Other jurisdictions probably do not share this reluc-
31 Kentucky; Georgia, Texas and some other states have different pro-
visions applicable to suits in equity and at law. KY. CODaS (Carroll,
1927) §§ 140, 143; TEx. ANN. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) arts. 2002, 3769.
32 Seddon v. Comm. Salt Co., Ltd., [1925] Ch. 187 (where a plaintiff
seeks to enforce a "re-entry clause" in a lease, he will not be granted an
order that the defendant file an affidavit of documents); Blackmore v.
Collins, 286 Fed. 629 (E. D. Mich. 1923) (interrogatories disallowed in
suit seeking statutory treble damages in patent infringement suit). Contra:
Standard Oil Co. v. Universal Co., 21 F. (2d) 159 (N. D. Ill. 1927);
Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 2 F. (2d) 473 (N. D. Ill. 1924) (these cases
do not repudiate the equitable tradition but hold it inapplicable to patent
cases).
33 Lee v. Blumer, 189 Iowa 1145, 179 N. W. 625 (1920) (action against
representative on decedent's note); Matter of Dooper's Will, 124 Misc,
411, 208 N. Y. Supp. 820 (Surr. Ct. 1925) (probate of will); Matter of
Butsch's Estate, 128 Misc. 29, 219 N. Y. Supp. 124 (Surr. Ct. 1926)
(proceedings to remove executor).
4 England does not allow it. E. v. E., 24 T. L. R. 78 (1907) (divorce
for cruelty in communicating venereal disease to wife); Thomas v. Thomas,
34 T. L. R. 434 (1918) (divorce for adultery).
35 Kursell v. Timber Operators, Ltd., [1923] 2 K. B. 202. Contra: Mat-
ter of Schwartz, 127 Misc. 452, 217 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
36 Herrmann v. Osborne Co., 128 Misc. 859, 220 N. Y. Supp. 306 (Sup.
Ct. 1927) (libel); cf. Palmer v. Hampton, 220 N. Y. Supp. 768 (City Ct.
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tance.3 7 If the statute provides for discovery in "special pro-
ceedings" this will probably not include a hearing on a motion."'
By and against whom discovery may be had. The usual lan-
guage in these statutes is to the effect that a party to a civil ac-
tion may be compelled to give discovery to the "adverse" or
"opposite" party. 9 Obviously this includes the usual case of the
plaintiff examining the defendant, and vice versa, where their
interest in the controversy is adverse. Where one is, however,
a merely nominal party, it is questionable whether he can be
compelled to give discovery at least unless the nominal party will
be liable to have a judgment for costs entered against him.' 9
Where there is in fact an issue between two parties, but they
are either co-plaintiffs or co-defendants on the record, they are
probably "adverse" within the meaning of this requirement."
But several states have thought it necessary to provide expressly
N. Y. 1927); Krumeich v. Sundelson, 131 Misc. 9, 225 N. Y. Supp. 667 (City
Ct. N. Y. 1927) (examination allowdd in action for malpractice). But cf.
Albanos v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 130 Misc. 566, 224 N. Y. Supp. 331
(Sup. Ct. 1927) ; Shaw v. Samley Realty Co., 201 App. Div. 433, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 531 (1st Dep't 1922).
37Parnell v. Walter, 24 Q. B. D. 441 (1890) (discovery allowed in libel
action); Griebart v. Morris, [1920] 1 K. B. 659; Robbins v. Brockton St.
Ry., 180 Mass. 51, 61 N. E. 265 (1901); B. & 0. S. W. R. R. v. Berdon,
195 Ind. 265, 145 N. E. 2 (1924); Warner v. Rochester & Co., 216 App.
Div. 115, 214 N. Y. Supp. 579 (4th Dep't 1926) (discovery in personal
injury cases). The Court of Appeals has refused to disturb this inter-
departmental conflict. Middleton -. Boardman, 240 N. Y. 552, 148 N. E.
701 (1925).
3"Bresadola v. Ry. & Light Co., 165 Wis. 109, 161 N. W. 362 (1917)
(motion to set aside summons for lack of jurisdiction).
ALA. CIv. CODE (1923) § 7764; MASS. GEN. LAwS (1921) C. 231, § 61;
TEx. ANN. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3769; Order XXXI, Rule 1, A.NUAL
PRACTICE (1928) 489; 1 YEARmx PRACrICE (1928) 440. Some statutes
provide that the deposition of a witness may be taken when he is a party.
N. Y. C. P. A. § 288; MO.NT. REv. CODES (1923) § 10645; cf. Am. JUD. SoC.,
RuLEs Crv. PROC. (1919) art. 22, § 1.
41 Codd v. Delap, [1906) W. N. 57 (no discovery against party disclaim-
ing all interest in the shares which were the subject of the suit). The
words "any other party" in Order XXXI, Rule 12 [ANNuAL PRACTicE
(1928) 519; 1 YEARLY PRACTICE (1928) 462] include such a nominal party.
Cory v. Cory, [1923] 1 Ch. 90.
Where a nominal defendant will be liable for costs, however, the plaintiff
can compel him to give discovery. Wells v. Green Bay Co., 90 Wis. 442,
64 N. W. 69 (1895); Aiken v. Baumann, 17 Abb. Prac. 28, note (N. Y.
1863).
41Thus rival claimants to funds paid into court by a shipowner may
examine each other, though both are defendants. The Nedenes, 41 T. L. R.
243 (1926). And legatees and devisees are examinable by contestants of a
will. Matter of Dooper's Will, supra note 33. But there must be an issue
between such co-parties. Shaw v. Smith, 18 Q. B. D. 193 (18S6); Mackay,
Lowell & Co. v. Dillon, 215 App. Div. 842, 213 N. Y. Supp. 681 (2d Dcp't
1926).
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for the examination of such co-parties.42 The Massachusetts act
provides that interveners and persons otherwise admitted after
the beginning of the suit are included by the word "parties." "
By the terms of the Massachusetts statute minors or persons
under guardianship may be examined if they are competent;
otherwise their guardians ad litem are examinable. 44 And Order
XXXI of the English Sutreme Court Rules applies to infant
parties and their guardians ad litem,45 but not to a lunatic party
or his guardian 46 except in a matrimonial suit.4T
Practically all of the statutes provide that if a private corpo-
ration is party to a suit it must give discovery," and this
includes non-resident corporations who have appeared or have
otherwise become subject to the jurisdiction of the court."' The
New York statute expressly includes "joint stock associations or
other unincorporated associations." 11 Where such associations
are permitted to sue or be sued in the association name, it seems
sensible to consider them as included in the word "party," but
the difficulty arises as to who shall give the discovery, and under
whose oath shall it be given. 1 It is usually provided that a cor-
42 N. C. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1919) § 907 and S. C. CODE: OF LAWS (1922) §
698 provide that a party may be examined by a co-plaintiff or co-defendant
as to any matter in which he is not jointly interested or liable with such
co-party, and as to which a separate and not joint verdict can be rendered.
TENN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1925) § 5683 provides that in chancery pro-
ceedings the deposition of a party may be taken by an adverse or co-party.
N. Y. C. P. A. § 288 and Wis. STAT. (1925) § 326.12 provide that a party
or his assignor may be examined. Query as to whether a party's assignor
must give discovery in the absence of such a provision. See Grinnell, Dis-
covery in Massachusetts (1902) 16 HARv. L. Rzv. 110, 123.
43 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 231, § 61. This provision was retained in
the draft act proposed by the Massachusetts Judicial Council in 1925.
FIRST REPORT OF MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1925) 144. The same
result is reached in England without such a provision. Eden v. Weardalo
Iron & Coal Co., 35 Ch. D. 287 (1884).
4MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 231, § 65.
45 Order XXXI, Rule 29, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 537; 1 YEARLY PRAC-
TICE (1928) 503.
46 Pink v. Sharwood & Co., Ltd., [1913] 2 Ch. 286.47 Paspati v. Paspati, [1914] P. 110.
48 In Texas a corporation can not take and .need not give depositions
under the deposition discovery statute. TEX. ANN. STAT. (Vernon, 1925)
art. 3769, par. 10; Sauermann v. El Paso Ry., 235 S. W. 548 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1921). It was for this reason that the statute reviving the old
equitable bill of discovery was enacted in this state in 1923.
49 Island Supply Co. v. Steitz, 127 Misc. 598, 217 N. Y. Supp. 154 (1st
Dep't 1926) ; Ky. Finance Corp. v. Allen, 171 Wis. 586, 178 N. W. 9 (1920).
50 N. Y. C. P. A. § 289.
51 In New York, for example, a partnership is not an unincorporated
association under this act unless it has a secretary or treasurer, so that
the managing employee of such a firm cannot be examined as such employee.
Roberts v. Hayden, 213 App. Div. 1, 209 N. Y. Supp. 598 (2d Dep't 1925)
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poration must give discovery through the proper officer or agent
and on his oath.52 Where, as in many of these jurisdictions, in-
terrogatories are delivered to the corporation, the wording of the
statute is relatively unimportant since there are fairly well set-
tled rules as to the duty of a party to ascertain lmowledge and
information within his control, and these would govern the
amount and sources of the disclosure required in the answer of
a corporation, through whatever officer or agent it might be
made. But where discovery is obtained by an examination be-
fore trial of an individual, it might make a real practical differ-
ence who the individual was. Under these statutes only those
in the employ of the corporation at the time of the examination
are subject thereto unless former employees are specifically
mentioned z3 And if the statute includes former employees, it
must embrace the employees of all parties in order to avoid an
unconstitutional discrimination against corporations., The New
York provision requiring an individual to be a managing
employee is liberally construed, 5 but seems to serve no useful
purpose.
In England the crown and its agencies cannot be compelled
to make discovery.5 6 There seems to be no American case deal-
(in this case the firm members were sued as individuals and were examined
as parties, but what would have been the situation had the suit been
against the firm in the firm name?).
In England the provision is that any body of persons empowered to sue
or be sued in its own name or in the name of any officer or other perzon
must give discovery. Order XXXI, Rule 5, ANNUAL PRAcrxcE (1928) 509;
1 YEARLY PRACTICE (1928) 456. This seems to avoid any possible difficulty.
52 Order XXXI, Rule 5, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 509; 1 YEARiLY PEAC-
TICE (1928) 456 ("member or officer"); AIA. CIV. CoDE (1923) ("such
officer agent or servant as may be cognizant of the facts") ; FLA. REV. STAT.
(1920) § 2734 (officer); N. J. Comip. STAT. (1910) § 140 ("such officers,
agents or employees as have personal knowledge of the facts or custody
of books, etc."); N. Y. C. P. A. § 289 ("officers, directors, managing agents
or employees"); WASH. CoMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) (any one in cor-
poration's "employ, or connected with it, or interested in it.").
53 Cokeley v. Bronx Nat. Bank, 127 Misc. 175, 215 N. Y. Supp. 311 (Sup.
Ct. 1926).
r4 Phipps v. Wis. Cent. R. R., 133 Wis. 153, 113 N. W. 456 (1907). The
Wisconsin statute now includes all former employees. Wis. STAT. (1923)
§ 326.12, par. 1.
5 Enequist v. Brooklyn City R. R., 216 App. Div. 730, 214 N. Y. Supp.
450 (2d Dep't 1926); West N% C. I. & B. R. R., 126 Misc. 674, 214 N. Y.
Supp. 475 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (conductor and motorman). And even where
the employee cannot be held to be "managing" the court may find that
"special circumstances" exist so as to render him examinable under the
act. Swift v. Gen. Baking Co., 129 Misc. 135, 220 N. Y. Supp. 554 (Sup.
Ct. 1927).
- In re La Soci6ft Affr~teurs R6unis, [1921] 3 K. B. 1. This does not
prevent the Crown's obtaining discovery from another party. Atty. Gen. v.
Newcastle, [1899] 2 Q. B. 478. And foreign sovereigns suing in English
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ing with this question, i.e., where discovery is sought of a state
or of the United States. Counties and municipal corporations are
deemed by some courts to fall within the category of "corpora-
tions" provided for in the discovery statutes.67 But other courts
do not take this view.58 The statutes in Massachusetts and Wis-
consin specifically provide that an officer of a municipal corpora-
tion shall give discovery.59
Under the statutes in several states, the person for "whose
immediate benefit" the suit is brought may be required to give
discovery, even though he is not a party.00
In the opinion of the writer no provision could be more simple
yet comprehensive than that of New Hampshire, as far as the
question of parties and persons who may be compelled to give
discovery is ? ncerned.61
Extent of discovery and grounds for resisting it. That the
answer to a question on oral examination or a written interroga-
courts must give discovery. South Afr. Rep. v. La Comp. Franco Belge,
[1898] 1 Ch. 190.
5YEx parte Elmore County, 207 Ala. 68, 91 So. 876 (1921) A munic-
ipal corporation must give discovery under the English rules. Prestney
v. Corp. of Colchester, 24 Ch. D. 376 (1883).
58New York v. Velmachos,' 129 Misc. 177, 221 N. Y. Supp. 40 (Sup.
Ct. 1927).
;9 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 231, § 65 (mayor or chairman of board
of selectmen); Wis. STAT. (1925) § 326.12, par. 1 (this includes "counties,
towns, villages, and cities"). Federal Equity Rule 58 provides that "public
corporations" must give discovery.
6o CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 2021; MONT. REV. CODES (1923) §
10645; N. C. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1919) § 906; N. D. Co0ir. LAWS ANN.
(1913) § 7869; S. D. REV. CODE (1919) § 2714; S. C. CODE OF LAWS (1922)
§ 697.
61 N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) c. 337, § 1: "The deposition of any witness
in a civil cause may be taken and used at the trial unless the adverse
party procures him to attend so that he may be called, to testify when
the deposition is offered." Ibid: § 11: "If the deposition of a party Is
taken it shall be filed. . . . Either party may use it unless the deponent
is in attendance."
Aml. JuD. Soc., RULES Crv. PROC. (1919) art. 22 provides as to parties:
"See. 1. Any party to an action shall attend, . . . upon demand of any
other party."
"Sec. 4. The examination of any party who cannot be compelled to
attend within the State, shall be taken in the same manner as evidence
may be taken outside the State for use at the trial."
"Sec. 5. The following persons may also be compelled to attend for such
examination: (1) any officer, agent, partner, stockholder or employee of
a party; (2) the next friend, guardian or guardian ad litem of an infant
party; (3) the committee or conservator of a party of unsound mind;
(4) the person for whose benefit an action is prosecuted or defended."
With the exception of former employees, agents, and officers of a party,
this statute seems adequate. It does, no doubt, provide for discovery by
unincorporated associations, municipal corporations, etc., when they could
be parties. Query as to a party's assignor. See supra note 42.
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tory, or the production of a document will incriminate the party
from whom discovery is sought, is a sufficient excuse for refusal
to give discovery.62 The statutes in many of the states provide
specifically that no party has a right to discovery of incriminat-
ing facts or documents, 3 but this seems scarcely necessary for
the courts seem never to compel discovery of anything which will
be inadmissible at the trial. Further, the facts or documents
which would be privileged at the trial because they were con-
fidential communications between a party and his solicitor, 1 or
between a party and a physician,s or which fall within the privi-
lege of either spouse not to testify against the other,"' or which
it is against public policy to have produced,'- need not be dis-
closed in proceedings before trial, even though no provision in
the discovery statute protects them. The fact that the answer
to an interrogatory or to questions on an oral examination may
be privileged does not, however, render the interrogatory or the
examination objectionable. The objection must be made in the
answer thereto.S
Discovery statutes pretty generally require that the matter or
thing sought be "pertinent," "material," or "relevant" to the
matter in issue." This again rules out what is inadmissible in
evidence on this score. It is usually, in fact, a much narrower
requirement, for it by no means follows that discovery will be
compelled of anything that can be admitted in evidence on the
62 Waterhouse v. Barker, [1924] 2 K. B. 759 (inspection of documents);
Lancashire v. Moynihan, 218 Blich. 16, 187 N. W. 319 (1922).
6ZAi-4- Civ. CODE (1923) § 7772; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5767; LA.
REV. CODE OF PPUC. (Mlarr, 1927) art. 349; Miss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 231,
§ 63; WASH. COmP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 1230. The Georgia statute
also renders privileged any answer which tends to disgrace or degrade the
party. GA. ANN. CODE (Mlichie, 1926) § 4554.
64 O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A. C. 581; Woodhouse & Co., Ltd., v.
Woodhouse, 30 T. L. R. 559 (1914); Southwork Water Co. v. Quirk, 3 Q.
B. D. 315 (1878); State v. Wood, 316 Mlo. 1032, 292 S. W. 1033 (1927). It
does not seem profitable here to discuss the extent of this or any other
privilege in detail.
65 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 201 Iowa 43, 206 N. W. 98 (1925).
60 M cGrew v. McGrew, 298 Fed. 204 (D. C. 1924).
C7 Asiatic Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Anglo-Persian Oil Co., Ltd., [1916] 1
K. B. 822 (communications as to the state of the British campaign in
the Levant); Chatterton v. Sec'y of State for India, [1895] 2 Q. B. 189
(official communications between officers of state).
6s Heit & Weisenthal v. Licht, 218 App. Div. 753, 218 N. Y. Supp. 102
(1st Dep't 1926) ; Allhusen v. Labouch~re, 3 Q. B. D. 654 (1873). Objection
on ground of privilege must be taken in answer. This is in accord with
the theory that such privilege is personal to the witness. WiGmorx, Evi-
DENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2196.
r9 A_.A. Civ. CODE (1923) § 7772; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 333;
IOWA CODE (1927) § 11316. The provision is very general. It is conceivable
although improbable that its omission might render the statute in conflict
with the "unreasonable searches and seizures" clause of the Constitution.
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trial.70 Some jurisdictions do, in effect, take this view, but the
more general rule limits the scope of discovery further to facts
and documents which are a part of the interrogating party's
case, and we shall proceed to a discussion of the extent and ap-
plication of this limitation.
A few statutes provide that a party need not give discovery
of a fact or document relating solely to his own case or title. 1
It is much more usual to find a provision that discovery may be
had of what relates to the merits of the action or defense there-
in.72 Under most statutes, however, it is recognized as a suffi-
cient ground for resisting discovery that the facts sought are
evidence tending only to support the case of the party from
whom they are sought. Thus very few jurisdictions compel a
party to disclose the names of his witnesses.14 But where the
information tends to support the case of the party seeking it, it
may not be withheld merely because it is also part of the case of
the party from whom disclosure is sought.",
Whatever must come from one party's side at the trial, any
fact which he must set up and prove under the issues as they
are formed by the pleadings, seems to be part of his case within
the meaning of this rule.76  Thus where the defense to an action
70 For example, Order XXXI, Rule 1 provides that interrogatories not
relating to the matter in issue are irrelevant although they would be
admissible on cross-examination at the trial. ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928)
489; 1 YEARLY PRACTICE (1928) 440.
71 England provides that a party need not produce a document if he
satisfies the court that it relates only to his own title, he being defendant,
Order XXXI, Rule 15, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 528; 1 YEARLY PRACTICE
(1928) 487.
72 The Arizona statute as to documents is typical, being like so many
others copied from the original New York statute. ARiz. REv. STAT. (1913)
§ 1759. For others see infra note 119.
73 Kimball v. Budr Co., 215 App. Div. 724, 212 N. Y. Supp. 404 (2d
Dep't 1925); Tichnor Bros. v. Bickle, 216 App. Div. 110, 214 N. Y. Supp.
547 (4th Dep't 1926); Hill v. Hill, 126 Wash. 560, 219 Pac. 18 (1923);
Downie v. Nettleton, 61 Conn. 593, 24 Atl. 977 (1892); Niven v. Nat,
Bank, 136 Atl. 334 (N. J. L. 1927); Ridgway v. Smith & Son, 6 T. L. R1.
275 (1890); McGarry & Co. v. S. P. Ry., 4 F. (2d) 421 (N. D. Cal. 1925).
74 Knapp v. Harvey, [1911] 2 K. B. 725; Oil Co. v. Dry Dock Co., 129
Misc. 289, 221 N. Y. Supp. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1927); McNamara v. N. Y. State
Rys., 129 Misc. 130, 220 N. Y. Supp. 522 (Sup. Ct. 1927) ; MAss. GEN. LAWS
(1921) e. 231, § 63 (except that court may order names to be disclosed
if it thinks necessary).
7' People's Bank v. Helms, 140 S. C. 107, 138 S. E. 622 (1927).
70 Trust Co. v. Prescott & Son, Inc., 221 App. Div. 420, 223 N. Y. Supp.
184 (4th Dep't 1927); Zeltner v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 220 App. Div. 21,
220 N. Y. Supp. 356 (1st Dep't 1927) (where defense is the non-per-
formance of a condition subsequent, namely, failure to keep proper books
and maintain business specified in policy, defendant can examine plaintiff
as to these issues); Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922)
(party claiming conveyance was void gift held entitled to interrogate adver-
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of libel or slander is privilege, and the plaintiff seeks to destroy
the effect of privilege, he must show malice and will be allowed
to have discovery of facts tending to show it7 And in an ac-
tion for injuries negligently caused, the facts of the defendant's
conduct at the time of the accident may be discovered.18 So
where there is a defense of payment,0 or lack of consideration,8,
these may properly be the subject of examination or interroga-
tories by the defendant. There is some question as to the extent
to which a defendant may obtain discovery under a general
denial."' There seems to be little if any reason why he should
not be able to compel disclosure of information upon those mat-
ters which he may introduce affirmatively under such a plea, and
on which he would have the burden of introducing evidence0s2
Further where the defendant will attempt to put a different com-
plexion on the situation which forms the plaintiff's case; where,
that is, he will try to set up a different version of the facts, he
should be allowed to obtain by discovery information tending to
impeach the plaintiff's version, or to support his own. 83  It is
sary as to whether it was gift); Sherwood Bros. v. Yellow Cab Co., 283
Pa. 488, 129 At. 563 (1925) (in action on contract to purchase all the
gas and oil consumed from the plaintiff, he is entitled to discovery of
the amount consumed by the defendant).
77 Chapman v. Leach, [1920] 1 K. B. 336; Plymouth Mut. & C. Soc. Ltd.
v. Trader's Pub. Co., Ltd., [1906] 1 K. B. 403.
78 Robbins v. Brockton St. Ry., supra note 37; Bolckow v. Fisher, 10 Q.
B. D. 161 (1882); Griebart v. Morris, supra note 37; B. & 0. Ry. v. Berdon,
supra note 37; cf. Palmer v. Hampton, s zpra note 36 (plaintiff in "dog-bite"
case allowed discovery as to scienter).
79Elterman v. Friedman, 126 Misc. 34, 212 N. Y. Supp. 92 (Sup. Ct.
1925). Where because of the structure of the pleading or the nature of
the case the plaintiff must prove payment, he is entitled to discovery
thereon. N. Y. Car Adv. Co. v. Regensburg & Sons, 205 App. Div. 705,
200 N. Y. Supp. 152 (1st Dep't 1923).
SO Lee v. Blumer, supra note 33; Calhoun v. Russ, 81 Fla. 773, 89 So.
134 (1921).
I" See Grinnell, op. cit. supra note 42, for a very good discussion of
discovery under a general denial.
8 Handel v. Co-Ed Dressmakers, Inc., 216 App. Div. 838, 215 N. Y.
Supp. 857 (1st Dep't 1926) (in an action by an employee for wrongful
discharge, the defendant can show under a denial that plaintiff could
have gotten another job, and hence may have discovery as to this point);
Cutter v. Cooper, 234 Mass. 307, 125 N. E. 634 (1920) (a general denial
interposed to a complaint alleging alienation of affections puts in issue the
previous bearing and state of mind of the spouses towards each other so
that the defendant may interrogate as to facts tending to show that the
conjugal affection had been at a minimum).
-' Thus in a suit on an alleged debt of the defendant's deceased partner,
on which the plaintiff claimed the firm was liable, where such liability
was denied the defendant could interrogate the plaintiff as to how the
alleged liability came into existence. John v. James, 13 Ch. D. 370 (1879).
And in an action for selling "spurious" products from plaintiff's containers,
the defendant could examine its officer as to the reports on which the
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true that the defendant would be able to bring out such informa-
tion at the trial-by cross-examining the plaintiff, but this should
be no objection to allowing as full a discovery before trial as is
necessary to serve the ends for which this machinery is valuable.
Before parties' to actions were competent witnesses, the chief
purpose of discovery was perhaps to obtain information which
was necessary for a party to bring his case or make his defense,
but which would otherwise be unavailable to him. Today that
information may be obtained at the trial. The dpvice may now
have a usefulness, aside from preventing substantial injustice,
in facilitating procedure by lessening the burden on the courts,
and saving costs to the parties. On this function it seems in-
deed that the emphasis should be placed. It can do this by in-
dicating to the parties before trial what issues it will be worth
while to controvert, and by settling those issues which it will
not. This would tend to discourage proceeding further with an
action for which there was clearly no support, or interposing a
hopeless defense. Even more frequently it would save time and
costs of proving at the trial matters over which there could be
little bona fide controversy. Thus it seems desirable to allow a
party to obtain his adversary's admissions concerning facts
which are within his own knowledge, or which he could prove
independently. Some courts allow this,84 but many require that
a party disclose only what is otherwise inaccessible to the ad-
verse party.5 The Wisconsin and Massachusetts statutes are
complaint was based, the ingredients of the plaintiff's product (to show
that defendant's was not "spurious") etc. Malted Milk Co. v. Spiegel
& Co., 155 Wis. 201, 144 N. W. 272 (1913). In a suit by an assignee,
where the validity of the assignment is denied, an examination as to the
facts of it was allowed where they were peculiarly within the plaintiff's
knowledge, although the plaintiff had the burden of proving the assignment.
Securities Corp. v. Assur. Co., Ltd., 124 Misc. 188, 207 N. Y. Supp. 282
(Sup. Ct. 1924) (the case was treated as showing "special circumstances").
Cf. Holmes, J.: "The facts are part of the plaintiff's case none the less
that the defendant's case may consist in pressing a different view as to
what the facts were." Robbins v. Brockton St. Ry. supra note 37, at 54,
61 N. E. at 266.
Similarly in England at any rate when the defendant is entitled to
particulars, interrogatories which demand no more than these would contain
must be answered. Saunders v. Jones, 7 Ch. D. 435 (1877); of. also
Ashley v. Taylor, 38 L. T. R. 44 (1878); Lyon v. Twedell, 13 Ch. D. 375
(1879). But cf. Sands v. Comerford, 211 App. Div. 406, 207 N. Y. Supp.
398 (4th Dep't 1925); Texas Co. v. Cohen, 15 F. (2d) 358 (C. C, A. 2d,
1926) ; N. C & St. Ry. v. Jenkins & Sons, 155 Tenn. 605, 296 S. W. 1 (1927).84 Lyell v. Kennedy, 8 App. Cas. 217 (1883) ; Texas Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co.,
12 F. (2d) 317 (S. D. Tex., 1926); Green v. Selznick, 220 App. Div. 12,
221 N. Y. Supp. 63 (4th Dep't 1927); Albanos v. News Synd. Co., Inc.,
supra note 36 (even where matter sought was on public record).
85 Hubert v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R., 90 Conn. 261, 96 Atl. 967 (1916);
Will v. Domer, 134 Wash. 576, 236 Pac. 104 (1925); cf. Lancashire v.
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very broad in their terms and are not open to the objection that
they limit the usefulness of discovery by limiting its scope.0
Under them "the scope of the subjects concerning which inter-
rogatories may be asked is as broad as the field of inquiry when
the person interrogated is called as a witness to testify orally in
the actual trial." 87 The Wisconsin rule is ever broader than
that in Massachusetts, in that it compels disclosure of facts in-
admissible as evidence which form the basis of pleadings, and
of the names of the adversary's witnesses.63 The American Judi-
cature Society favors a statute as broad in scope as that in
'Massachusetts.3 ' Irrespective of the scope of the provision, the
courts, with the exception of Wisconsin,'1' seem to protect against
"fishing expeditions" which pry into an adversary's case. But
there are other ways in which the machinery of discovery may
be abused, other types of "fishing expeditions." The scope of
an examination, an interrogation, or an order for inspection
of documents may be so broad as to amount to what some
courts call a "roving commission." For example it may be
part of a party's case to prove that his adversary's title is de-
fective, so that an interrogatory such as "Is there not an out-
standing mortgageto A on this land?" would be proper. Yet to
allow a party to require his adversary s'mply to set out his title
might be undesirable. At any rate, the courts evince a strong
tendency to discountenance such broad interrogation. No
statutory provision is usual or necessary on this point as lon,
as it is the courts which ultimately pass on the propriety of
questions propounded.", The English provisions discussed below
Moynihan, supra- note 62 (matter sought was on public record). There
seems to be more justification for such a holding although the party
should be required to admit the execution of such a document if requested.
Also discovery to enable a party to draw up pleadings would seen ti
serve a different function.
SG M &-ss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 231, § 61 provides that a party may be
interrogated as to facts and documents admissible in evidence at the trial
of the case. The proposed acts of the Judicature Conimission in 1921 and
of the Judicial Council in 1925 retain this provision. Wis. STAtT. (1923) §
326.12, par. 5 provides that after the service of the complaint an examina-
tion may be had as if the complaint were in issue.
'7 Rugg, C. J., in Cutter v. Cooper, supra note 82, at 314, 125 N. E. at
636. In Kelly v. C. & N. W. Ry., 60 Wis. 480 (1S84), it was held error
to limit the defendant's ex:amination to the issue of contributory negligence,
on which he had the affirmative.
-s1 Malted Milk Co. v. Spiegel Co., supra note 83.
89 Am. JuD. Soc., RULES Cn,'. PROC. (1919) art. 22, § 8 provides: "Upon
examination the witness may be examined by the party seeking discoveiy,
upon the whole case and as if an adverse witness at trial."
91, Nohl, Discovery Proceedings in Wiscoiwin (1918) 2 ALIIQ. L. REsv. 137.
1 Jones v. Watts, 43 Ch. D. 574 (1889) (application for deeds relating
to a title in issue is too broad); Hall v. Truman, Hanbury & Co., 29 Ch.
D. 307 (1885) (application for documents within a general class is too
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seem to take care of the case of production of documents.
Unless it is within his power to obtain such control or knowl-
edge,12 discovery may be successfully resisted by a party on the
ground that the document or information is not within his con-
trol or knowledge. It is where he has this power that the ques-
tion arises as to the extent of his duty to exercise it. If he has
possession of a document merely as agent for another who is not
a party, he cannot be compelled to produce it without that other's
consent.9 3 Otherwise it is generally required that a party must
6btain knowledge and documents which are in the possession or
control of his agents and servants, at least where such servant
or agent is still in the party's employ0 Only information ob-
tained by the servant or agent in the course of his employment is
thus obtainable. °
broad); Miller & Pardee, Inc. v. Sweet Mfg. Co., 3 F. (2d) 198 (S. D.
Cal. 1925) (interrogatory as to general stage of the art at the time of
a patent allegedly infringed is too broad) ; Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat. Bank,
40 Idaho 712, 237 Pac. 284 (1925).
Some courts require that the question be clear and narrow, embodying
a definite set of facts so that they can be taken pro confesso on failure to
answer. Grain Co. v. Townsend, 267 S. W. 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
But such questions have been disallowed where the court feels that they
are hypothetical merely, and calculated to feel out the situation. Grum-
brecht v. Parry, 49 L. T. R. 570 (1883), aff'd, 32 W. N. 558 (1884).
Under some circumstances the courts seem to allow such "roving" orders
for discovery. Waynes, Merthyr & Co. v. Radford & Co., [1896] 1 Ch. 29
(when a particular instance of fraud is alleged and admitted a general
discovery to documents to show other probable frauds was allowed).
2 Wilson v. Raffalovitch, 7 Q. B. D. 553 (1881); Lancashire v. Moynihan,
supra note 62; Cohen v. Int'l Brokerage Co., 124 Misc. 860, 208 N. Y.
Supp. 715 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
93 William v. Ingram, 16 T. L. R. 434 (1900). But otherwise where
the books also contain the personal accounts of the party. State v. Mc-
Elhinney, 300 Mo. 564, 253 S. W. 1063 (1923). The American Judicature
Society would abrogate the rule. Am. Jun). SOC., RULES CIV. PuOC. (1919)
art. 21, § 12 provides: "By order of court any party shall be entitled to in-
spect any document which is .. .in the possession of the party giving
discovery only as agent or on behalf of another."
94 Bolckow v. Fisher, 10 Q. B. D. 161 (1882); Robbins v. Brockton St.
Ry., supra note 78. And a solicitor or banker is an agent within this
rule. Foakes v. Webb, 28 Ch. D. 287 (1884); of. Alliott v. Smith, [1895]
2 Ch. 111, 114. A partner must exercise his legal right to have access to
partnership books. Taylor v. Rundell, 1 Phill. 222 (1842). But of. Davis
v. District Court, 195 Iowa 688, 192 N. W. 852 (1923) (court may not
compel Director General of Railroads to produce documents not in his
custody although act of Congress gives him power to require them),
WASH. ComP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 1227 provides that a corporation
shall be excused from answering only where it shows that no one in its
employ or connected with it, or interested in it, can give the desired infor-
mation. The necessity of this provision seems questionable.
9 9Wellsbach Lighting Co. v. New Sunlight Co., [1900] 2 Ch. 1; Han-
cock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 107 Mass. 113 (1871). This was not so in
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THE MACHINERY
In eleven states, the federal courts, and in England the pro-
pounding of written interrogatories to be answered by the ad-
verse party comprises a more or less important element in the
machinery of discovery. In most of these jurisdictions it is of
paramount importance.
Before a recalcitrant or dilatory party can be punished either
by process of contempt, or otherwise, for failure or delay in
answering interrogatories there must be a court order that he
make answer.90 There are two methods, with variations, of pro-
viding for such a court order. The English Rules provide that
interrogatories shall be delivered "by leave of court." 0 The
party seeking discovery must serve a copy of the interrogatories
and a summons "two clear days" before the hearing on the ap-
plication. In passing upon the application, the court or judge
shall grant leave to deliver only such interrogatories as shall be
considered necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause,
or for saving costs.2'  Interrogatories must be answered by affi-
davit within ten days, or such time as the court shall allow.1
On failure to answer, or on insufficient answer, the court may
on motion order the party to answer, or answer further, by affi-
davit or on viva voce examination.2'- Thus there is a hearing on
the interrogatories before their delivery, and a weeding out at
the threshold of those that are objectionable for any reason.'"
The system has received high praise.'"2 But it has been pointed
out that it is adapted to the practice of sending each case to a
master or registrar to decide matters preliminary to trial. And
equity. Supra note 18. It would probably not be so under statutes provid-
ing that interrogation is only limited to the scope of an examination on trial.
96 Epstein v. American Co., 95 N. J. L. 391, 113 At]. '19 (1921). This
is a case of oral examination. There seems to be no case directly supporting
the statement made but on the other hand there is not a single case the
writer has discovered where an attempt was even made to punish the party
without obtaining a court order.
97 Order XXXI, Rule 1, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 489; 1 YEARLY PmC-
TICE (1928) 440.
98 Order XXXI, Rule 2, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 508; 1 YERLY "PAc-
TICE (1928) 453. The Rule also provides that the court in passing on such
application shall consider any offers of the answering party to make ad-
missions or produce documents.
99 Order XXXI, Rule 9, ANNUAL PRAcTICE (1928) 517; 1 YE&RLY PRAC-
TICE (1928) 460.
'10 Order XXXI, Rule 11, ANNUAL PrAcTICD (1928) 517; 1 YEA-RLY
PRACTICE (1928) 461.
"01 The party answering may make further objection in his affidavit in
answer. Order XXXI, Rule 6, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 510; 1 YEARLy
PRACTIcE (1928) 457.
102 Sunderland, An Appraisal of Evzglish Proccdurc (1925) 24 31ICII. L.
REV. 109.
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the Massachusetts Judicial Council is of the opinion that a modi-
fication of the present Massachusetts practice will be less of a bur-
den on the courts in the absence of such masters or registrars.1 0'
In Massachusetts, interrogatories are filed with the clerk of
the court, and a copy of them delivered to the person to be inter-
rogated or his attorney. On failure to answer within ten days,
the party interrogating may move the court to order answers to
such interrogatories as are proper. 1 4 Thus there is no hearing
by the court on the propriety of the interrogatories propounded
until it is asked to compel answers. The limitations and difficul-
ties of this system spring from the fact that some attorneys de-
liver an excessive number of interrogatories, which the adverse
party refuses to answer, and that a court order is thereby fre-
quently made necessary.o' Yet it is the system in general use
in America with minor variations. In some states interroga-
tories are filed with pleadings."" In others a court hearing may
be obtained by the interrogated party on objection to the inter-
rogatorids.1°7 In the absence of any such objection, the pressure
on the court would, of course, be slight. In some cases a court
order is entered by consent." 8
In most jurisdictions no affidavit is required to be filed with
the interrogatories or application for court order. Alabama'"
and Louisiana 110 require an affidavit of materiality to be filed
with the interrogatories. In Connecticut, if the movant for dis-
covery makes an affidavit of his belief in the matters set out in
the motion, the adverse party must plead, answer or demur
thereto within the time specified by the court.' Under the
Iowa statute, if a party filing interrogatories fails to file an affi-
davit stating what facts he expects to prove thereby, no facts
can be treated as admitted by a failure to answer.112 And four
states provide that failure to answer shall not work a continuance
of the trial, even where the party sought to be interrogated
103 FIRST REPORT OF MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1925) 42.
1o4 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 231, § 63, as amended by Mass. Acts.
1922, c. 314.
105 FIRST REPORT OF MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1925) 42.
100 ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) §§ 1248, 1252; IND. ANN.
STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 383 (to be answered within time limited by court);
IOWA CODE (1927) § 11185 (to be answered when that pleading must be
answered); KY. CODES (Carroll, 1927) §§ 140, 143; LA. REV. CODE OF PRAC.
(Marr, 1927) art. 347.
107 N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910) 4097, § 140; IOWA CODE (1927) § 11187.
108 Free v. Telegraph Co., 135 Iowa 69, 110 N. W. 143 (1907).
1o ALA. CIV. CODE (1923) § 7764.
110 LA. REV. CODE OF PRAC. (Marr, 1927) art. 350 (where defendant inter-
rogates plaintiff).
111 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5765.
112 IOWA CODE (1927) § 11191; Hogaboom v. Price, 53 Iowa 703, 6 N. W.
43 (1880); ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 1259, semnble.
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is absent, unless such an affidavit has been filed.21 3 It is sub-
mitted that such provisions are unnecessary. Unless discovery
is given without objection a court must, under any system, pass
on the interrogatories before anything can be done about failure
to answer fully. And the helpfulness of affidavits in such a case
is not apparent.
Some statutes provide that interrogatories may be filed as soon
as a party has filed his pleading,"' but others require that the
issues be closed before questions can be propounded.'"7 Those
states providing machinery for the discovery of facts before
pleadings avail themselves of deposition and examination stat-
utes. The English rule makes it discretionary with the court
whether answers to interrogatories or a bill of particulars shall
be ordered first, when they are sought by adverse parties.""0 It
is usually discretionary with the court, also, whether the
party who has filed interrogatories shall be allowed to file further
questions."7
The English rules provide that in considering whether leave
should be given to deliver interrogatories, the judge or master
shall consider any offers to make admissions, deliver particulars
or produce documents by the person sought to be interrogated.'a
The Judicial Council of Massachusetts commends the insertion
of such a clause.'"
The usual provision as to failure to answer interrogatories
properly is that the court may attach the recalcitrant part, for
contempt, or strike out his pleadings and enter a judgment or
decree against him, or both.1"' A few provide that the answers
"23IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 383; IOWA CODE (1927) § 11138;
Ky. CODES (Carroll, 1927) § 145; An . DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moseo,
1921) § 1254.
114 See supra note 104; also: Order XXXI, Rule 1, ANN-UAL P&%CTIC-
(1928) 489; 1 YEAR Y PRACTICE (1928) 440; MlASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c.
231, § 61; WASH. COMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 1226.
11z N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910) 4097, § 140.
116 Order XXXI, Rule 20, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1923) 532; 1 YEArLy Prac-
TICE (1928) 493; 'hyte & Co. v. Ahrens & Co., 50 L. T. R. 344i (18M3);
Waynes, Mlerthy ,r & Co. v. Radford & Co., szpra note 91; British T-H Co.,
Ltd. v. Duram, Ltd., [1915] 1 Ch. 823. In these cases discovery was al-
lowed first since'it was necessary as a basis for the required particulars.
-7 MAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 231, § 63; Lyell v. Kennedy, sup a note
84; Boake v. Stevenson, [1895] 1 Ch. 358, 360; cf. Phipps v. Wis. Cent. Ry.,
supra note 54; Norman Oil Corp. v. Bensabat, 118 Misc. 398, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 356 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (second examination allowed in court's discre-
tion).
"s Order XXXI, Rule 2, ANNUAL PiUCTICE (1928) 508; 1 Y.UL.y PRAc-
TICE (1928) 453.
" FIRST REPORT OF LASSACHUSETTS JUDICUAL COUNCIL (1925) 43, 144.
120 Order XXXI, Rule 21, ANNUAL PRAcrIC (1928) 533; 1 YEAmLY PRAc-
TICE (1928) 499; ALA. Crv. CODE (1923) § 7770; FL. REv. STAT.
(1920) § 2734; GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 4553; IND. ANN. STAT.
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to the interrogatories be taken pro confesso, following the old
equity tradition.121
Discovery may also be had by examination and deposition.
Where the testimony of a party is taken after the examining
party has filed his first pleading, or after the issues have become
formed, the usual machinery for procuring the attendance of the
party to be examined is the same as that for any other witness
who may be examined on deposition. Thus California simply
provides that the testimony of a witness within the state may
be taken where "the witness is a party to an action . . .etc." "I
North Carolina, North and South Dakota have, and formerly
South Carolina had, similar provisions.123 The American Judi-
cature Society in its draft act would require any party to an ac-
tion to attend and testify upon demand by any other party.'2 '
Under such provisions no court order or affidavit by the examin-
ing party is a condition precedent to the taking of the testimony
on deposition.125 Consequently the party seeking discovery need
(Burns, 1926) § 383; IowA CODE (1927) § 11192; KY. CODES (Carroll,
1927) § 151; N. J. Coip. STAT. (1910) 4097, § 140; WASH!. COMP. STAT.
(Remington, 1922) § 1230.
121 LA. REV. CODE OF PRAC. (Marr, 1927) § 349; TENN. ANN. CODE (Shan-
non, 1925) § 5692.
122 CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 2021. The Montana provision is
copied from this. MONT. REv. CODE (1923) § 10645.
123 N. C. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1919) c. 12, § 90 provides: "The examina-
tion, instead of being had at the trial, as provided in the proceeding, may be
had at any time before the trial at the option of the party claiming it,
before a judge, commissioner duly appointed to take depositions, or clerk
of the court, on a previous notice to the party to be examined, and any
other adverse party, of at least five days, unless for good cause shown
the judge or court orders otherwise."
And § 903 provides: "If a party refuses to attend and testify, as pro-
vided in the preceding sections, he may be punished as for a contempt, and
his pleadings may be stricken out." Almost identical statutes are N. D.
CoruP. LAWS ANN. (1913) §§ 7864, 7867; S. C. CODE OF LAWS (1922) §§
692, 695; S. D. Rnv. CODE (1919) § 2714 (party compellable as witness).
The New Hampshire statute referred to above is similar. N. 1H. PUD.
LAws (1926) c. 337, §§ 1, 11. The Indiana depositions statute is similar.
IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§ 564, 565. See also WiS. STAT. (1925)
§ 326.12. But these rules require a court order to fix the time and place.
124 Am. Jun. Soc., RULES CIv. PROC. (1919) art. 22, § 1. The Massachu-
setts Judicature Commission in its final report recommended the following:
"In order to make such examination any party may apply to a justice of the
peace, notary public, or special commissioner, who shall issue notice to the
party to be examined to appear before said justice, etc .... at the time
time and place, etc. . . . Notice shall be given to all parties to the proceed-
ings or to their attorneys of record.... ." FINAL REPORT OF MASSACIHUSETTS
JUDICATURE COIISSION (1921) 151.
125 Vann v. Lawrence, 111 N. C. 32, 15 S. E. 1031 (1892); Fox v. Clif-
ton Mfg. Co., 122 S. C. 86, 114 S. E. 700 (1922); Niblo v. Ede, 39 S. D.
338, 164 N. W. 109 (1917).
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make no showing of good cause or excuse therefor, or indicate
the scope of his examination.120, The fact that the issues are
formed would, of course, be some protection to the examined
party, as the scope of the examination is always limited to mat-
ters relevant to those issues,2 7 or to the matter in the pleadings
ified by the examining party, where issues are not yet formed.
But the legislature in South Carolina, at any rate, found this
latitude so undesirable that it amended the act, thereby maling
it necessary to obtain a court order on good cause shown before
a party was entitled to have an examination.12 8 In New Jersey,
a statute providing that a party could be compelled to attend an
examination on a subpoena was held constitutional.' :2 But for
another reason the present act in New Jersey provides for ex-
amination only on court order.12' The system in New York is
more complicated. The examining party may procure a court
order in the first instance on motion and filing an affidavit. 13
But the more usual procedure today is to give reasonable notice
of the intention to take a deposition to the adverse party or his
attorney, stating (1) the person before whom it is to be taken;
(2) the time and place; (3) the persons to be examined; and (4)
the matters on which the examination is to be.222 The person
sought to be examined may then raise questions as to the right
to take, time or place of taking, the subject matter of the exam-
ination, and the persons before whom it is to be taken, on a
motion to the court to vacate or modify the notice.23
Where the statutes do not expressly provide otherwise the pen-
alty for failure to attend and testify is the same as for any other
witness. And in addition most of the statutes provide that the
pleadings of a recalcitrant party may be stricken out.2, As has
120 There is no such requirement in any of these statutes. See also cases
supra note 125.
127 N. J. CoiP. STAT. (1910) 4097, § 140.
128 S. C. Acts 1923, 170; White v. Life Ins. Co., 134 S. C. 183, 132 S. E.
171 (1926).
129 Epstein v. American Co., szpra note 96. The act under consideration
was N. J. Laws 1914, c. 96, 151. The Indiana act has been held constitu-
tional. Keviatkowski v. Putzhaven, 189 Ind. 119, 120 N. E. 3 (1919).
130 N. J. Laws 1924, c. 93, p. 183.
231 N. Y. C. P. A. § 292, Rule 122.
132 Ibid. § 290. Rule 121 requires notice to be served at least five days
before the examination.
133 Ibid. § 291. The grounds for the motion to vacate must be stated
therein, and the motion may be supported by affidavit. Service of notice
of the motion operates to stay the taking of testimony until the determina-
tion of the motion. The motion is determined on (1) the notice of in-
tention to take testimony, (2) the pleadings, if any, (3) such affidavitz as
the parties may submit.
"34 See statutes supra note 123 and IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 568.
New York does not allow such striking out. Roseberg Holding Co. v. Ber-
man, 214 App. Div. 146, 211 N. Y. Supp. 900 (2d Dep't 1925).
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been seen, a court order is generally not a condition precedent to
a party's right to examine his adversary. But it is questionable
whether a person can be committed for contempt, or have his
pleadings stricken out, before such an order has been obtained.""
So if the deposition is not taken before a judge, it is usually pro-
vided that any refusal to attend and testify is to be reported to
a judge. And he shall order the recalcitrant party to attend,
testify, or answer specific questions which are proper.130 Where
a party is entitled to the examination as of right, it is often held
that the judge has no discretion in issuing such an order.137
An opportunity is usually given to the party examined to an-
swer ftlly and introduce into his answer whatever is necessary
to qualify or explain admissions made in them. And the stat-
utes allow a re-examination of such, party by his own counsel
upon the matters brought out on the first examination.138 For
135 Epstein v. American Co., supra note 96; Keviatkowski v. Putzhaven,
supra note 129.
Some statutes provide that a notary, justice of the peace, or commissioner
who may take a deposition, may commit for contempt a person disobeying
a subpoena issued by such officer on refusing to testify before him. Mo.
REV. STAT. (1919) § 5640; N. C. CODE (1927) § 1816; Wis. STAT. (1925) §
326.12 (8). Such statutes have been upheld. Ex parte Alexander, 163 Mo.
App. 615, 147 S. W. 521 (1912); State v. Taylor, 268 Mo. 312, 187 S. W.
1181 (1916); Benckenstein v. Schott, 92 Ohio St. 29, 110 N. E. 633 (1915),
But other courts regard such a delegation of the contempt power as uncon-
stitutional and require a court to make an order and then proceed to attach
the recalcitrant party. Burns v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 1, 73 Pac. 597
(1903); Fertilizer Co. v. Taylor, 112 N. C. 141, 15 S. E. 69 (1893); of.
Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N. C. 190 (1891).
36 IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 468; N. Y. C. P. A. Rule 129;
FINAL REPORT OF MASSACHUSETTS JUDICATURE COMuMISSIONS (1921) 151;
Burns v. Superior Court, supra note 136. Even in the absence of any pro-
vision the court may order a party to answer proper questions. Finn v.
District Court, 145 Iowa 157, 123 N. W. 1066 (1909).
137 This seems to be the effect of the cases cited supra note 125. Under
them the applicant need not show good cause for taking the deposition.
The wording of the act proposed by the American Judicature Society would
seem to allow a discretion as to what constitutes good cause for failure.
Am. JUD. Sec., RULEs CIV. Pnoc. (1919) art. 22, § 7: "If any person fails
to attend or testify as provided in this article, the court shall, upon motion,
issue a rule directed to him to show cause why an attachment for con-
tempt should not issue, or why his complaint, answer or other pleading
should not be struck out; and such order shall be made if good cause is
not shown."
Query whether a showing that the examination is unnecessary to save
costs or prevent substantial injustice will suffice under this rule. Query
also as to whether the judge may consider offers to make admissions, etc.
under it.
138 CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 2055; S. C. CODE OF LAWs (1922) §
696; S. D. REv. CODE (1919) § 2714. The absence of such provision seems to
make no difference. Wabash R. R. v. Morgan, 132 Ind. 430, 31 N. E. 661
(1892); Mosier v. Stoll, 119 Ind. 244, 20 N. E. 752 (1889).
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the rest the conduct of the examination is like that on trial, the
person holding it passing on objections to questions and an-
swers.139
Many of the statutes set out requirements as to the time and
place for holding the examination. If a court order is made nec-
essary for the examination, such questions could well be left in
the discretion of the judge granting it."1  Otherwise the statute
might make some reasonable requirement.14 1 Very frequently
it is provided that no party"', is compellable to be examined in a
county other than that of his residence if he lives within the
state, or in the county where served.142 There are various pro-
visions as to non-residents. 4 3
The machinery is similar when the examination takes places
before the filing of pleadings, in those states where this is pro-
vided.' There is one important difference: a court order sup-
ported by an affidavit is always a condition precedent to such
an examination.' 45 The affidavit then must contain a statement
of the nature of the expected action and the subjects on which
examination is sought, as well as the necessity therefor.14 0
It is also frequently provided that where the answer of the party ex-
amined introduces new matter which is not strictly responsive, the examin-
ing party may contradict or testify as to it. S. C. CODE OF IWS (1922) §
696; Tux. ANN. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3769, § 0; ARK. DIG. STAT.
(Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 1250 (interrogating party may file sworn
statement as to such matter to be used as deposition.)
139 CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 2055; N. Y. C. P. A. Rule 129.
'40 A1%. JUD. Soc., RULES Civ. PRoc. (1919) art. 22, § 2.
- 'A common provision is for five days notice unless the court orders
otherwise on good cause shown. See statutes supra note 123.
- N. J. CoMiP. STAT. (1910) 4099, § 145; Wis. STAT. (1925) § 326.12 (6)
(residence only); N. C. CoNs. STAT. ANN. (1919) § 902; N. D. COMP.
LAws ANN. (1913) § 7864; AM. JuD. Soc., RLu3 CIV. PROC. (1919) art.
22, § 3 provides: "The time and place for such examination shall be rea-
sonably convenient to the party to be examined, and no party sall be com-
pelled to attend for such examination in any county other than one in
which the action is prosecuted or in which he resides, maintains an office or
place of business, or is regularly employed."
'43 N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910) 4099, § 145 (non-resident compellable in any
county in New Jersey or where he resides; and he may be served without
the state by personal service); WIS. STAT. (1925) § 326.12 (6) (non-resi-
dent compellable in any county where served). The deposition of a non-
resident party may be taken in the same manner as that of any other non-
resident witness.
'-Very few jurisdictions provide for discovery before the delivery of
the plaintiff's complaint, at least. See a plea for such procedure. Bax,
The Right of Discovery (1920) 55 LAw J. 415. The American Judicature
Society does not favor discovery at this time. ALT. JLuD. Soc., RULES CIV.
PRoc. (1919) art. 22, § 2 and note.
'- N. Y. C. P. A. § 295 and Rule 123; Wis. STAT. (1927) § 326.12 (5);
Chesson v. County Bank, 190 N. C. 187, 129 S. E. 403 (1925). In Ohio
an action for discovery may be brought in such a case. Onio GEN. CoDE
(1925) § 11555.
246N. Y. C. P. A. Rule 123; Chesson v. County Bank, supra note 145.
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The majority of states which use the written interrogatory to
obtain discovery, allow the answers to be introduced at the trial
only by the party propounding the questions. 14  States having
deposition statutes generally allow the deposition to be read in
evidence by either party 148 and even under the usual interroga-
tory statute where the evidence has been introduced by the party
interrogated without objection, the interrogating party cannot
subsequently have it stricken out.114  The general rule seems to
be that the answers or deposition are evidence, but may be re-
butted by any other evidence which the jury finds sufficient for
this purpose."50
Where both parties may introduce such matter at the trial,
it makes little difference that neither is obliged to read the whole
of the deposition, but may use extracts only. The situation is
different, however, in the case of answers to interrogatories
which the interrogating party alone may introduce. Some states,
in consequence, require such party to put all the answers in evi-
dence if he puts in any.151 Others allow him to put in any, but
provide that the judge may order him to put in also any other
closely connected answers.
15 2
For a sufficient affidavit, see Whitehurst v. Hinton, 184 X. C. 11, 113 S. E.
500 (1922). The affidavit need not set out a cause of action. Sewing Ma-
chine Co. v. Lang, 186 Wis. 530, 203 N. W. 399 (1925). But it is insuffi-
cient if it shows that no cause of action exists. State v. Milwaukee E. R.
& L. Co., 136 Wis. 179, 116 N. W. 900 (1908); Grossmann v. Equit. Trust
Co., 216 App. Div. 765, 214 N. Y. Supp. 674 (2d Dep't 1926). The trial
court has discretion tb deny an order for such an examination where it
appears that the party seeking it has sufficient facts to enable him to plead.
Ellinger v. Equit. Life Assur. Soc., 138 Wis. 390, 120 N. W, 235 (1909).
147 Order XXXI, Rule 24, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 534; 1 YEARLY PRAC-
TICE (1928) 501; ALA. Crv. CODE (1923) § 7768; FLA. REV. STAT. (1920)
§ 2734; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 383; N. J. CoMBP. STAT. (1910)
4097, § 140; VA. CODE ANN. (1919) § 6236. Cont'ra: IOWA CODE (1927) §
11185.
148 N. C. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1919) § 902; N. J. Coip. STAT. (1910) 409D,
§ 146; N. Y. C. P. A. § 303; S. C. CODE OF LAWs (1922) § 693. The Now
Hampshire act allows either party to introduce such deposition in evidence
unless the party-deponent is in attendance. N. H. PuB. LAWs (1926) c. 337,
§ 11. And even where the deponent is in attendance, his answers on the
examination are admissible as admissions, or can be used as prior incon-
sistent statements.
249 Grannan v. Fox, 100 N. J. L. 288, 126 Atl. 398 (1924).
ISO ALA. Crv. CODE (1923) § 7771; CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 2055;
N. C. CoNs. STAT. ANN. (1919) § 904; N. D. ComnP. LAWS ANN. (1913) §
7866; S. D. REV. CODE (1919) § 2714; N. Y. C. P. A. § 305; Woodman v.
Powers, 242 Mass. 219, 136 N. E. 352 (1922).
Query whether in the absence of any such provision, some courts might
not apply the old equity rule.
11 Southern Ry. v. Hubbard, 116 Ala. 387, 22 So. 541 (1896); of. LA.
Rsv. CODE OF PRAC. (Marr, 1927) art. 356.
"2 Order XXXI, Rule 24, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 534; 1 YEARLY PRAC-
TICE (1928) 501; Bradley Lumber Co. v. Cutler, 253 Mass. 37, 148 N. E.
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The Alabama statute provides that the court may require an
interrogated party to attach copies of relevant letters or docu-
ments to his answers.153 And in New York and Wisconsin, the
party whose deposition is to be taken may be compelled by sub-
poena dvcces tecun to bring such documents to the examination
and produce them."' In New York their use, when so produced, is
limited to refreshing the witnesses' memory, urless the subpoena
issued under a court order."'
The most generally used method in the United States for pro-
curing a discovery of documents is, however, to apply for a court
order for their production, inspection, and copy. 1 1 The applica-
tion must be supported by an affidavit setting forth the grounds
on which the discovery is sought and describing the document
accurately.I--7 The denying of the order is to some extent dis-
101 (1925). New Jersey will not exclude an offered answer on the ground
that other answers were not also offered unless they are shown to be
(1) material, and (2) tending to explain, qualify or limit the offered
answer. Cetofonte v. Camden Coke Co., 78 N. J. L. 662, 75 AtI. 913 (1910).
13 ALA Civ. CODE (1923) § 7772. WAsH. CoDiP. STAT. (Remington, 1922)
§ 1226 provides that after filing his pleadings a party may file interroga-
tions for the discovery of facts and documents.
"r4 WIS. STAT. (1925) § 326.12 (3); Roberts v. Hayden, swpra note 51;
N. Y. Car Adv. Co. v. Regensberg & Sons, supra note 79. But cf. Trust
Co. v. Prestcott & Son, Inc., 221 App. Div. 420, 223 N. Y. Supp. 184 (4th
Dep't 1927) (holding that N. Y. C. P. A. §§ 283, 289 did not provide for
subpoena dwes tec.mu); cf. FLA. REv. ST.T. (1920) § 2735.
'5 The only statutory provision as to production of books, documents,
etc. at an examination is limited to the ease where such an examination
is had under a court order requiring such production. N. Y. C. P. A. §
296. This section provides that documents so procured may come in in
evidence. The cases cited supra note 154 were not under this section.
But there the use of such documents was limited to refreshing the wit-
ness's recollection. N. Y. Car Adv. Co. v. Regensburg & Sons, supra note
79. And in any event only such documents as could be used to refresh the
witness' memory can be procured. Singer v. Nat. Gum & Mica Co., 211
App. Div. 758, 208 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dep't 1925).
" 0The California statute is typical: "Any court in which an action is
pending, or a judge thereof may, upon notice, order either party to give
to the other, within a specified time, an inspection and copy, or permission
to take a copy, of entries of accounts in any book or of any documcnt or
paper in his possession or under his control, containing evidence relating
to the merits of the action, or defense therein... 11 CAL. Civ. CODE (Deer-
ing 1923) § 1000. Similar provisions are: ARiz. REv. STAT. (1913) § 1759;
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5164; FLA. REv. STAT. (1920) § 27'3;
IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1925) § 536; IowA CODE (1927) § 11316; Mi:.
STAT. (Mlason, 1927) § 9386; MO. REV. STAT. (1919) § 1370; MONT. REV.
CODES (1923) § 9771; N. J. Comp. STAT. (1910) 4098, § 142; N. Y. C. P. A.
§ 324, Rules 140-142; N. C. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1919) § 1323; Omo GE .
CODE (Page, 1926) § 11551; S. C. CODE OF LAws (1922) § 689; S. D. REv.
CODE (1919) § 2712; WIS. STAT. (1925) § 327.21. Some of these states seem
to provide for a double machinery, the usefulness of which is hard to see.
IND. AN.N. STAT. (Burns, 1925) § 535; MTo. REV. STAT. (1919) §§ 1375, 1376.
"5 Some statutes specifically require an affdavit. IOWA CODE (1927) §
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cretionary with the court.158 And the order, if granted, must
contain a full and accurate description of the documents sought,
and cannot be too broad.159
England also provides for production of documents under a
court order.160 But this is not the procedure in general use
there.161 Rule 12 of Order XXXI allows a party to apply without
affidavit for a court order that the adverse party discover on
oath all documents in his possession or power (or that have
been so) relating to any matter in question. And the judge
may make this order in his discretion if in his opinion it is
necessary "either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or
for saving costs." If the order is granted, the adverse party
must draw up and deliver an affidavit describing the documents
and stating which of them he objects to producing and the
grounds of such objection.162 And Rule 15 of Order XXXI pro-
vides that a party may give written notice to any other party
in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made to any docu-
ment, to produce such document so that the party giving notice
may inspect and copy it. The word "affidavits" is construed to
include answers to interrogatories,'" and affidavits of docu-
ments.104 The party receiving notice must, within a few days of
its service, allow such inspection, except of documents which
he is not bound to produce.105 If he fails to set a time or place
11317; N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910) 4098, § 143; VA. CODE ANN. (1919) § 6237.
The statutes of Indiana and Missouri seem to require an affidavit under only
one of the methods provided in those states. See supra note 156. In the ab-
sence of statute the rule seems to be the same. State v. District Court,
27 Mont. 441, 71 Pac. 602 (1903); Funkenstein v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.
App. 663, 139 Pac. 101 (1914); Evans v. S. A. L. Ry., 167 N. C. 415, 83
S. E. 617 (1914). In England an affidavit is not necessary. Order XXXI,
Rule 14, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 525; 1 YEARLY PRACTICE (1928) 477.
158 Order XXXI, Rule 14, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 525; 1 YEARLY
PRACTICE (1928) 477; MacCay Realty Co. v. Superior Court, 254 Pac. 287
(Cal. App. 1927); Hope v. Brash, [1897] 2 Q. B. 188. But see Calhoun v.
Russ, supra note 80.
159 Bank v. Superior Cburt, 192 Cal. 395, 220 Pac. 422 (1923); Broad-
way Furniture Co. v. Superior Court, 123 Atl. 566 (R. I. 1924); Co-op.
Tobacco Pool v. Oleson, 191 Wis. 586, 211 N. W. 923 (1927). Reasonable
latitude in the description will be allowed. Davis v. District Court, supra
note 94. It is immaterial that the documents are out of the state. Ross
v. Robinson, 185 N. C. 548, 118 S. E. 4 (1923).
160 Order XXXI, Rule 14, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 525; 1 YEARULY PRAC-
TICE (1928) 477.
16111 HALsBuRY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (1910) 68.
162 Order XXXI, Rule 13, ANNUAL Practice (1928) 523; 1 YEARLY PRAC-
TICE (1928) 471. Order XXXI, Rule 13A provides that the judge may in
his discretion order a list of the documents instead of an affidavit. AN-
NUAL PRACTICE (1928) 524; 1 Yearly Practice (1928) 476.
101 Moore v. Peachey, [1891] 2 Q. B. 707.
164 Hunter v. D. W. & W. Ry., L. R. 28 Ir. 489 (1891).
165 Order XXXI, Rule 17, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 530; 1 YEARLY PRAC-
TICE (1928) 489.
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for the production, the court will do so.'r" The court may also,
within its discretion, order the production of specific documents
not referred to in the pleadings or affidavits, on the application
of a party, supported by an affidavit describing the documents,
showing that the applicant is entitled to inspect them, and that
they are in the power or possession of an adverse party.G7
Similarly the court may, on a proper affidavit, order a party to
state by affidavit whether he has or at any time has had a
particular document, or class of documents, in his power or pos-
session, and what has become of them.cs
The party giving discovery may seal up irrelevant or privi-
leged portions of the document to be inspected.co England and
Ohio allow the court to inspect documents to determine the merit
of the claim of privilege made for them.
No American state has adopted the machinery of the English
courts as provided in Order XXXI to any great extent. New
York has enacted Rules 15 and 19A (Z).m And Massachusetts
provides for the inspection of documents referred to in the plead-
ings or bill of particulars unless the court is satisfied that there
is a reasonable excuse for their non-production.172- Both the
Massachusetts Judicature Commission 173 and the American
Judicature Society,"" however, favor the adoption of the English
method of obtaining discovery of documents, with minor
variations.
The statutes provide various penalties for failure to give
proper discovery of documents. It is not unusual to empower
the court to exclude the document sought from evidence or punish
the recalcitrant party for contempt, or both. 75 And if the party
166 Order XXXI, Rule 18 (1), ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 500; 1 YalLY
PRACTICE (1928) 490.
27 Order XXXI, Rule 18 (2), ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 5130; 1 YELn x
PRACTICE (1928) 491.
168 Order XXXI, Rule 19A (3), ANNUAL PRACTIcE (1928) 532; 1 YrEARLY
PRACTICE (1928) 495.
:L9 ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 528; MASS. GEN. L,%Ws (1921) c. 231, § 67.
10 Order I, Rule 19A (2); ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 531; 1 YEUmy
PRACTICE (1928) 494; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 11553. Such a pro-
vision is recommended by the American Judicature Society. Am. JuD. Soc.,
RULES Civ. PROC. (1919) art. 21, § 14.
171 N. Y. C. P. A. §§ 326, 328.
1- MASS. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 231, § 68.
17 FINAL REPORT OF MASSACHUSETTS JUDICATURE COMI~SSION (1921)
910, 153.
274 Am. JuD. Soc., RULES Civ. PROC. (1919) art. 21.
:L-ARIz. REv. STAT. (1913) § 1759; CAL. CiV. CODE (Deering, 1923) §
1000; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1925) § 536; MINN. STAT. (lazon, 1927)§ 9886; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 1378; MONT. REV. CODES (1923) § 9771;
N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910) 4098, § 142; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 11552:
S. C. CODE OF LAWS (1922) § 689; S. D. REv. CODE (1919) § 2712; Wis.
STAT. (1925) § 327.22. In England it is provided that where a document
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seeking discovery wants the document in evidence, he may intro-
duce on his behalf parol evidence of its contents. 17 Other states
provide that judgment or decree be entered against the recalci-
trant party, or that his pleading be stricken out.11 Nor are these
provisions unconstitutional." 8
Several of the states have statutes providing that if a party
exhibits a document to his adversary and requests an admission
of its genuineness, the party requested must bear the costs of
proving such genuineness at the trial, if he fails to make the
admission and genuineness is actually proved. 17 The statutes
in Connecticut and Wisconsin also include admission of a docu-
ment's existence. 180  Some of these states also have a similar
provision as to the admission of the existence or correctness of
is properly sought it shall be excluded from evidence if not produced, there
being no excuse for non-production. Order XXXI, Rule 15, ANNUAL PRAC-
TICE (1928) 528; 1 YEARLY PRACTICE (1928) 487.
Where a recusant party recants and offers to produce the document
before trial, it may not be excluded on trial. Sallander v. Prairie Life Ins.
Co., 112 Neb. 629, 280 N. W. 344 (1924).
170 Most of the statutes cited supra note 171 expressly so provide. But
the rule is the same in the absence of such provision. Silvers v. Junction
Ry., 17 Ind. 142 (1861); cf. Sallander v. Prairie Life Ins. Co., 110 Neb.
332, 193 N. W. 737 (1923).
277 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5768 (non-suit or default); FLA. REV.
STAT. (1920) § 2733; MICH. Comp. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) c. 234 §§ 21, 22;
Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 1377; VA. CODE ANN. (1919) § 6237. England pro-
vides for this penalty where a court order has been disobeyed. Order
XXXI, Rule 21, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 533; 1 YEARLY PRACTICE (1928)
499. In New York the court may (1) enter the appropriate judgment; (2)
strike out a pleading of the recalcitrant party; or (3) debar him from
maintaining the defense or claim in connection with which discovery was
sought, or the party may be committed for contempt. N. Y. C. P. A. § 325.
But where the facts in connection with which discovery was sought can be
admitted without impairing a claim or defense, the court may not strike
out that claim or defense. Feingold v. Walworth Bros. Inc., 238 N. Y. 446,
144 N. E. 675 (1924); Comment (1925) 10 CORN. L. Q. 234.
17a Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 29 Sup. Ct. 370
(1908) (defense stricken); Miles v. Armon, 239 Mo. 438, 144 S. W. 424
(1911) (non-resident defendant's answer stricken); Ky. Finance Corp. v.
Allen, supra note 49. But a court probably has no constitutional power to
strike out a defendant's pleading for disobedience to a court order in ab-
sence of such a statutory grant of the power. Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S.
409, 17 Sup. Ct. 841 (1897).
279 Order XXXI, Rule 2, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 508; 1 YEARLY PRAC-
TICE (1928) 453; N. C. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1919) § 1825; N. Y. C. P. A.
§ 322; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 11550; S. C. CODE Or LAws (1922) §
689; S. D. REv. CODE (1919) § 2711. New Jersey had such a statute. N. J.
ComP. STAT. (1910) 4097, § 141. But it was repealed by N. J. Laws 1912,
c. 231.
180 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5776; WIS. STAT. (1927) § 327.22. The
latter statute includes "the existence, due execution, correctness, validity,
signing, sending or receiving of any document."
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facts before trial. 81 All of these admission statutes give to
the court discretion as to taxing costs if the request was unrea-
sonable or the refusal reasonable.
Such statutes seem to be peculiarly adapted to aiding in the
attainment of the aims of discovey, viz., saving costs and clearing
up before trial matters over which there is no real dispute. The
Massachusetts Judicial Council 182 and the American Judicature
Society 18 3 recommend their adoption as to both facts and
documents.
In England the court has discretion to tax the costs of dis-
covery on the basis of the reasonableness and propriety with
which it is sought. And the court must investigate this on the
request of either party.84  The party seeking discovery may be
required to deposit £5 to secure costs, which will be returned
unless costs are eventually taxed against the depositor.' There
are very few American statutes that deal with the point
specifically.26
CONCLUSION
On the whole the usefulness of discovery seems to be limited
by technical limitations as to its scope and as to palties e.xamin-
able. It is submitted that the statutory provisions dealing with
the extent of discovery be made as broad as possible. Protection
against "fishing" can best be afforded by allowing the trial court
to exercise its sound discretion on this point. This would lend
elasticity to the system and the very apparent conservatism of
the courts in this regard precludes the possibility of grave danger
resulting from broad provisions.
Machinery is provided to allow the court to exercise this dis-
cretion if every application for discovery must be passed on.
Or if this imposes too great a burden on the courts, the statute
may require that only those applications which are objected to
be passed on by the court.
1s Order XXI, Rule 4, ANNUAL PILWTICEn (1928) 509; 1 YEARCY PRAC-
TICE (1928) 456; N. Y. C. P. A. § 323; WIS. STAT. (1927) § 327.22.
182 FIRST REPORT OF MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1925) 144.
183 A i. JUD. SOC., RULES CIV. PRoC. (1919) art. 32.
184 Order XXXI, Rule 3, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 509; 1 YEAULY PrAc-
TICE (1928) 455.
-5 Order XXXI, Rules 26, 27, ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928) 534, 536; 1
YEARLY PRACTICE (1928) 501, 523.
'so In Massachusetts the 'costs are in the discretion of the court. BIASS.
GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 231, § 66. New Jersey provides that the party ex-
amined shall receive witness fees, to be paid in the first instance by the
party examining, as well as other costs of discovery, unless the court or
judge orders otherwise. If the party examined loses the case, only such
sums as the court deems reasonable are taxed against him. N. J. CoiP.
STAT. (1910) 4099, §§ 147, 148.
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Discovery of information from an adversary seems to be most
effectively obtained by oral examination before trial. This has
the advantage over written interrogatories that any "con-
frontatory" method of procedure has over one that is "episto-
lary." And it is not apparent how it would put any greater
burden on the court by requiring a larger number of rulings.
Some provision for examination before pleadings are filed
seems useful. Theoretically at least, the earlier in the case
discovery is had, the greater the resulting saving of time and
costs.
The English procedure for obtaining discovery of documents
seems satisfactory. The affidavit is made pursuant to a court
order, but subsequent demands to inspect documents named
therein do not require action by the court. Perhaps it would
be feasible to require the affidavit to be delivered merely on
notice and provide that the party giving discovery could raise
any question by a motion to vacate.
